Paradox of Method: Suresh Chandra on Social Scientific Research by Tharakan, Koshy
The Philosophy 
of 
Suresh Chandra
Edited by 
R.C. Pradhan
Indian Council of Philosophical Research
New Delhi
© Indian Council of Philosophical Research 2004
All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be 
reproduced in any form, or by any means, without the written 
permission o f the publisher.
Published by M ember-Secretary for 
INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH 
Darshan B ha wan 
36 Tughlakabad Institutional Area, M ehrauli-Badarpur Road, 
(near Batra Hospital), New Delhi 110 062
ISBN: 81-85636-74-5
Typeset by 
Print Services 
B-17, 2nd Floor, Lajpat N agar Part 2, 
New Delhi 110 024
Printed in India 
at Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd., Noida 201 301
12
Paradox of Method: 
Suresh Chandra on Social Scientific 
Research
KOSHY THARAKAN
The reason why we think that interpretation is restricted to 
either inevitable distortion or literal reproduction is that 
we want the meaning of a man’s works to be wholly posi­
tive and by rights susceptible to an inventory which sets 
forth what is and is not in those works. But this is to be 
deceived about works and thought.
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Signs
The point that Merleau-Ponty raises here is quite significant 
to my discussion of Suresh Chandra’s views regarding social 
scientific research. My paper is based on a Presidential Ad­
dress delivered by Suresh Chandra at the Indian Philosophi­
cal Congress held in Jadavpur quite some time ago. What he 
said then need not be the whole of his ‘thought’ on this topic. 
Some of the points that I raise might have already been taken 
care of by Suresh Chandra and even if it is not so, what I 
discuss here is still part of his thought and works in the sense 
in which Merleau-Ponty understands the work of a thinker. 
In another important sense, all that I discuss below is also a 
part of Suresh Chandra’s thought and works because he him­
self was one of my teachers in Hyderabad who trained me to 
think philosophically.
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In order to understand the paradox of social science re­
search as pointed out by Suresh Chandra, we may recall that 
scientific investigations consist in methodical inquiries. It is 
the adherence to ‘method’ that makes any inquiry scientific 
in the sense of being objective and the results thus attained 
as valid for all those who undertake the inquiry. Thus if the 
method is the route to scientific knowledge, our investiga­
tions with regard to social reality to be ‘scientific’ cannot but 
stick to proper methodology. As Suresh Chandra rightly notes, 
there are two types of methods that are widely used in social 
science research, namely ‘Positivistic’ and ‘Normative’. Ac­
cording to him, it is ‘... these methods which are responsible 
for the paradoxical situation of social science.’5 The positiv­
ists construe social science as fundamentally similar to natu­
ral science. Thus the positivist standpoint represents what is 
known as ‘methodological monism’. The rationale for such a 
unity of method thesis consists in the conviction that the 
social world originates from and is continuous with the natu­
ral world and as such it has nothing to do with normative or 
ideological interpretation.2 As against the positivists, the pro­
ponents of normative interpretation consider only such inter­
pretations as legitimate for social sciences. They may very 
well concede a positivistic methodology for natural sciences 
but nevertheless argue for a different methodology for the 
study of social reality. Their rationale for holding such a 
‘methodological dualism’ consists in their belief that the two 
worlds are not continuous with each other. Rather the social 
world is a construction and as such it involves ideological 
and norm ative elements. There is another strand of 
‘interpretivism’ that upholds the unity of method. According 
to it any inquiry is interpretive as there is nothing like pure 
description. Since all observations are theory-laden, even our
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observations of the natural world also have an interpretive 
bearing.
Suresh Chandra points out that the advocates of normative 
interpretation would even go to the extent of saying that a 
positivist social science, say history, is no ‘history’ if it merely 
replicates historical ‘facts’. He uses an analogy from the 
domain of art to explain the interpretivists’ standpoint. Thus 
he draws our attention to the debate between the advocates 
of ‘Realism’ in painting and the practitioners of ‘Cubism’. 
According to the latter, it is only cubism, only abstract art is 
art. Their argument is that only in the case of abstract art is 
the mind of man made to think. In a realist painting, the job 
is better done by a camera and consequently the artist is 
redundant. In other words, the practitioners of abstract art 
construe art as a specialized ‘discipline’, as an academic 
pursuit. It needs an expert to judge the beauty of an abstract 
painting. Thus, with abstract painting, art is liberated from 
the hands of the common man. Similarly, the interpretivists 
argue that history done in the photographic fashion is no 
history. History is no science if it merely copies the events. 
Here the assumption is that ‘science’ is an abstraction and as 
such it cannot remain at the level of ‘pure descriptions’. The 
concept of positivist science is based on the concept of pure 
description, something that does not involve any interpreta­
tion. But such a concept of ‘science’ is a myth. Thus Suresh 
Chandra feels the need to lift history from the stage of pure 
descriptions. History done in the positivist mode is history 
cast in the photographic mould. To have the academic status, 
history must give up its photographic character. It must ac­
quire the normative and ideological character, if it aspires to 
be a science.
Now, the issue as I understand it concerns the question: 
can there be at any stage a photographic history, one that
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needs to be lifted from pure descriptions? It seems to be an 
impossible stage. Unlike the ideological conviction of cu­
bists regarding the prestige of art as something to do with its 
belonging to an academic discipline, a status it acquires by 
virtue of abstractions and interpretations, the interpretivists 
do have an epistemological point to negate the plausibility of 
positivist science. The interpretivists would argue that there 
could be no photographs’ of social or historical events sim­
ply because there is nothing to be photographed. The social 
world is a construction. It is this assertion of the interpretivists 
that generates what Suresh Chandra identifies as the Second 
Paradox of social science research. The paradox consists in 
‘...the kind of opposition that an ideological interpreter gives 
to the positivistic interpretation of science.’3 As Suresh 
Chandra notes, according to the ideological interpreter there 
can be no such thing as a positivistic science. All science is 
ideological; there is no objective ‘reality’ and therefore no 
‘final court of appeal’. Even in art, the artist by using his 
hands and eyes distorts reality. He paints reality as he sees it 
and not reality as it is. But then what is the paradox involved 
here? There will not be any paradox of the kind Suresh 
Chandra refers to if the interpretivist claims that there is 
nothing like reality as it is, all that there is are our view­
points. It is our viewpoints that make reality. It is not that 
Suresh Chandra fails to recognize this. He very well notes 
this when he makes the following remark about the 
interpretivist stance: ‘Not only that none of us as a matter o f  
fact are in contact with the naked reality, but none of us 
could ever be in such a contact. The naked reality is a mi­
rage; all reality is dressed up. Not only this, the dresses con­
stitute the whole of reality.’4 Nevertheless, Suresh Chandra 
sees a paradox here. But the paradox arises only because he 
believes there are some ‘facts’ out there, some ‘truths’ to be
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known independent of our viewpoints.5 In other words, the 
paradox that he alludes to is an epistemic paradox of 
knowability. The knowability paradox arises from accepting 
that some truths are not knowable and that any truth is know- 
able.6 If there is reality as it is and all that we can capture by 
way of our epistemic practices is reality as we see it, then 
there indeed is a paradox. Suresh Chandra seems to sub­
scribe to this.
Suresh Chandra claims th a t£... the occurrence of a histori­
cal event and so also of its being photographed are essential 
conditions for a genuine scientific history to be written.’7 
According to him, the photographs do have a function, as it 
is the datum on which the historians work. The historian in 
explaining an event needs to capture the event first by way 
of a photograph and only if such a photograph is available 
can he proceed to ‘explain’ it. Thus Suresh Chandra argues 
that the positivistic account of history cannot be rejected as 
useless. Rather it is the foundation of all kinds of historical 
interpretations to be given. Here Suresh Chandra seems to 
dilute his original characterization of positivistic science. 
Earlier he talked about the positivistic science as based on 
the concept of ‘pure description’ and denounced it as a myth 
or in any case it was a myth for the interpretivists. So when 
he now talks about the necessity of positivistic account, as it 
is the foundation for any interpretation, it does not necessar­
ily follow that such a foundation is devoid of any interpre­
tation. Rather the datum, the event that needs to be explained 
is already the result of some interpretations. Thus the photo­
graph is not a pure description devoid of any interpretations. 
The very fact that the historian chooses to capture the pho­
tograph of a particular segment of historical reality rather 
than some other segment betrays his interpretive preferences. 
I think this is what we primarily mean when we say that all
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observations are theory-laden and there is nothing like pure 
descriptions. But then this is not just a peculiarity of social 
scientific research. All our inquiries are carried out within 
this interpretive net. Once this is granted, the issue is the 
possibility of further interpretations of the very same photo­
graphic datum. Obviously such possibilities rest on the avail­
ability of the photograph in the first place. This I think is 
what Suresh Chandra means when he asserts the necessity of 
positivistic account. Nevertheless he envisages further inter­
pretations of such data in the course of historical research. 
According to him, histories ‘written in the positivistic fash­
ion are nothing but files of the photograph.’ Thus he says: ‘... 
the economic interpretation of history is not the photographic 
account of history, yet without the photographic account of 
history the economic interpretation of history would have 
been impossible.’8 My problem here is our difficulty to visu­
alize any account of history as a photographic account. Take 
for example the recent controversy over an NCERT text­
book. It characterizes the events that took place in Russia in 
the year AD 1917 as a ‘coup’. Earlier accounts of the same 
event describe it as a ‘Revolution’. The ideological interpre­
tations are evident in the very labeling of the event. Either 
you may call it a coup or a revolution or any other descrip­
tion you deem to be apt according to your ideological stance. 
But it seems impossible to characterize the event devoid of 
any labeling. Even a chronicle has to baptize the event and 
baptism of any sort is normative at some level. This does not 
mean that only the name exists and no ‘event’ at all, yet 
without the name we cannot refer to the event. Then where 
is the scope for a positivistic account of history?
It may be that what Suresh Chandra calls a ‘positivistic’ 
account of history is one that faithfully captures the events as 
they were understood by the historical spectators themselves.
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In other words the events that took place in Russia in the 
year a d  1917 are understood or described by the people who 
‘witnessed’ the events. I say ‘witnessed’ because I hope it 
would do justice to the positivistic ideal o f ‘objectivity’ thereby 
eliminating the subjective colourings of the participants who 
either acted in a manner of favouring the occurrence of the 
event or in a manner of preventing it from taking place. But 
even this prescription seems to be impossible according to 
Gadamer. For Gadamer interpretation is not a matter of re­
construction a, la Dilthey. Rather it is mediation. In order to 
understand the past, we mediate the past meaning into our 
situatedness. That is, our historicity is an integral part of our 
understanding. It is historicity, even though it involves pre­
suppositions and prejudices that open the past for us. The 
metaphor of ‘fusion of horizons’ captures this aspect of un­
derstanding. For him, genuine understanding is a fusion of 
horizons in which the subject and object of knowing are 
fused together such that knowing the other is knowing one­
self. It is this element of ‘prejudice’ in our understanding that 
marks Gadarper’s philosophical hermeneutics from traditional 
hermeneutics. Thus it seems that the task of writing history 
in the positivistic manner is never realizable in the actual 
process of history writing.
The impossibility of a positivistic account thus undercuts 
the second paradox that Suresh Chandra identifies with his­
torical research. Nevertheless, a shade of this paradox may 
seem to remain in other social scientific inquiries, particu­
larly in sociology and social anthropology. Recall that the 
second paradox that Suresh Chandra talks about arises only 
if we accept the notion of reality as it is over and above our 
perspectives or interpretations. Such a view is held explicitly 
by some interpretivists and implicitly by positivists with re­
gard to the relevance of an agent’s motives or intentions in
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understanding his or her actions. Sociologists of Weberian 
legacy consider grasping the agent’s point of view as neces­
sary for our understanding of action. Here the assumption is 
that there is some ‘fact of the matter’ with regard to the 
agent’s point of view that needs to be captured. Now, if it is 
argued that it is not possible to capture the agent’s intentions 
or motives, as these are not amenable to objective sensory 
perception, the paradox resurfaces. Of course positivists skirt 
this paradox in social science research by arguing the irrel­
evance of such mental states for our understanding of social 
reality. For them what is important in understanding social 
reality are the objective consequences of action rather than 
subjective intentions or motives. Thus after all there seems to 
be a paradox of the type Suresh Chandra identifies with social 
science research carried out in the Weberian fashion.9
The ideal of recapturing what the agents ‘have in mind’ as 
the goal of social scientific understanding operates with what 
Quine calls the ‘museum myth’ view of meaning. According 
to the museum myth, meanings are determined by the speak­
er’s intention. It conceives language as providing the ‘labels’ 
for meanings, which are mental entities. Quine’s naturalism 
is a strong indictment of this myth of the museum. It rejects 
the very conception of capturing the agent’s intentions, as 
there is no such determinate ‘fact of the matter’. In other 
words, Quine proposes the ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ and 
the impossibility of translating the intentions of the agent, as 
there is always underdetermination of meaning by experi­
ence. Consequently there can be no objective basis that de­
termines the meaning of action, let alone recapturing the 
agent’s intended meaning. For Quine, reference cannot be 
secured merely by recognizing a thing. The rationale behind 
this is Quine’s thesis of ‘inscrutability of reference’ and the 
philosophical lesson that Quine wants to convey through these
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problems of reference is primarily the thesis of ‘ontological 
relativity’. The adoption of such a framework is arbitrary, 
chosen by convention and it is erroneous to think that we can 
get to the ‘roots of reference’ in an absolutist manner. Thus 
the hope to find the uniquely correct meaning or the attempt 
to capture the agent’s intended meaning is like the search 
after the Holy Grail.
Thus the second paradox that Suresh Chandra talks about 
does not really arise, given that the social world is a con­
struction by the agents by bestowing meaning on their acts 
and there is nothing like a uniquely correct meaning to which 
the agents have a privileged access. Thus only the first para­
dox remains. It seems to me that Suresh Chandra himself 
ultimately recognizes only this paradox as even though he 
mentions these two paradoxes, the Presidential address he 
delivered was titled ‘The Paradox of Social Science Research’, 
thereby negating a plurality of paradox. The paradox as Suresh 
Chandra characterizes it consists in the impossibility of avoid­
ing different competing ideologies. Since what is ‘unwritten’ 
is open to \  multiplicity of readings, different interpretations 
vie with each other for legitimacy and we have no ‘final 
court of appeal’ to settle it one way or other. It is important 
to note here that even this paradox does not arise if one 
claims that what is called social science is hardly a science. 
Science by its very nature is objective in the sense of being 
possible to arrive at intersubjective agreement. So the para­
dox consists in claiming scientific status to social inquiries. 
Nevertheless, this way of avoiding the paradox is forestalled 
by Suresh Chandra. He considers such a move as an aca­
demic absurdity and says it is no defense of an ideological 
interpretation.10 It is so because, as Suresh Chandra points 
out, the scientific status of history consists in its ability to 
‘acquire the normative and ideological character’ and such a
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normative dimension is the aspect of transcending the posi­
tivist ideal of photographic history’. It is absurd to conceive 
the very same normative and ideological dimensions that 
ascribe the scientific status to history while jettisoning the 
scientific status of history. This absurdity may be the real 
paradox of social science research.
If it is argued that the kind of interpretation that is central 
to doing ‘science’ is not the same as the kind of interpretation 
that besets social scientific understanding, then even this 
paradox does not arise. In fact, Charles Taylor provides such 
an argument." What makes us think that there is no distinc­
tion between the two kinds of interpretation is our blind al­
legiance to the new kind of ‘interpretivism’ that argues for 
the unity of method. According to Taylor, this new call for 
the ‘unity of science’ based on hermeneutics is not in tune 
with reality. He is in agreement with the post-positivist phi­
losophers of science in holding that the logical positivist’s 
understanding of science is unacceptable as it failed to assign 
any place for interpretation. Nevertheless, Taylor is of the 
opinion that such an interpretative element within the prac­
tice of ‘science’ is different from the kind of understanding 
that is central to social sciences. Taylor points out that our 
scientific understanding arises as a refinement of our ordi­
nary understanding. This ordinary understanding or ‘pre-un­
derstanding’ is prior to any theoretical stance and cannot be 
exhaustively formulated. Rather, our formulation of how to 
deal with things or theorization makes sense to us because of 
this background knowledge or pre-understanding. When we 
say that science or for that matter any inquiry is interpretive, 
it is this ordinary understanding that we refer to. Interpreta­
tion that is central to social sciences is much more than this 
kind of understanding. It is hot just the kind of understanding 
that is required for an implicit grasp of things. Rather it is the
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kind of understanding that one needs in order to grasp the 
‘desirability characterizations’. These desirability characteri­
zations are descriptions that lie beyond the limits of natural 
sciences. Natural sciences are characterized by the require­
ments of ‘absoluteness’. Natural sciences, as Taylor points 
out, seek an account of the world independent of the mean­
ings it has for human beings.
Thus, I would say that even this paradox does not really 
obtain as the interpretative dimension that inscribes our in­
quiry as scientific is not the same as that which generates a 
multiplicity of interpretations vying with each other. Such 
possibilities of different interpretations only underscore the 
‘essential contestability’ of social sciences. Nevertheless such 
possibilities of interpretation do not rule out intersubjective 
agreement. Also, some interpretations may fare better than 
some other interpretations when we take the whole of the 
socio-historical world into account. Thus one may argue that 
the events of AD 1917 as they happened in Russia are better 
interpreted as a ‘Revolution’ in the context of struggle as 
envisaged in Marxian political theory. This line of argument, 
of course, presumes that the events are the outcome of cer­
tain political ideology. The moving force of such ideologies 
may in turn rest on the existence of certain other socio-his­
torical reality. Thus, though the social world, including the 
historical world, is a construction, an ideological one at that, 
as Suresh Chandra rightly points out, the whole of social 
reality cannot be treated as mere ‘constructs’. It has got some 
‘thingly’ reality that enables such constructions. Sometimes 
this ‘thingliness’ of the socio-historical world constricts our 
interpretations. For example, the strong archaeological evi­
dence that may obtain in the course of our historical inves­
tigations will rule out certain hitherto accepted interpreta­
tions as no more valid. In other words, the ‘photographic
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data’ as Suresh Chandra may call it, plays a crucial role in 
our interpretations. Here, it may be pointed out that the ar­
gument for a ‘methodological dualism’ based on the discon­
tinuity of the social world from the natural world is mis­
taken. As has been pointed out above, there are occasions 
when the natural world provides the material basis or the 
‘thingliness’ of the social world. To that extent the methods 
of natural sciences do have a role to play in our investiga­
tions pertaining to the social world. Where the positivists got 
it wrong was their refusal to accept this ‘thingliness’ as al­
ready interpreted.
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